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1Abstract
We show that monetary trading is simple, self-enforcing, symmet-
ric, and irreducible in a natural framework. Furthermore, we show
that the utility for each economic agent is at least as big under the
monetary system as under any other simple, self-enforcing, symmetric,
and irreducible trading system of the same complexity. Thus, we ra-
tionalize the monetary nature of real-world trade as being an eﬃcient
way to achieve those properties.
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Proposed Running Head: Monetary Trading
2“The search for a means of exchange is almost as old as
mankind.” — The Economist, December 22nd 2001, page 87.
1 Introduction
Throughout time the means of exchange have changed considerably. Many
commodities have been used as media of exchange, including chocolate,
shells, butter, salt, and, of course, paper. Recently, technological devel-
opments led to a substantial increase of cash substitutes like electronic
payments and credit cards in most developed countries.1 Despite all the
technological developments in payment systems, the nature of exchange in
developed economies is strikingly similar to what is has been before — each
person has a balance, which rises when he gives up goods, and falls when
he acquires goods. The trading system is, in an informational sense, still
a monetary one: all that has changed is that the balance, which was once
physical, has become virtual.
This persistence of monetary exchange is puzzling. Given the advances
in record-keeping and communication technology, it now seems feasible to
1Humphrey and Vesala (1996) found that “in all (fourteen) developed countries but
the United States, electronic payments have been either the sole or the primary reason for
the thirty four percent rise in total non-cash payments between 1987 and 1993.”
3design a trading system which conditions trading behavior in information
that monetary exchange ignores. By taking into account that information,
such a trading system has the potential to be more eﬃcient than a mon-
etary one. In fact, Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998) explicitly design a
non-monetary trading system, which is more eﬃcient than a monetary sys-
tem whenever the record-keeping technology is suﬃciently developed. Why
do not real-world trading systems exploit these eﬃciency gains? Why do we
observe monetary trading and not some other trading arrangement?
In this essay, we provide an answer to these questions. Several authors
have pointed out that many real life institutions are self-enforcing, treat
individuals symmetrically, cannot be simpliﬁed, and their rules are simple
to understand. Furthermore, they argue that those properties seem nec-
essary for any social institution to endure. Following their work, we will
construct in a natural framework a monetary trading system that is simple,
self-enforcing, symmetric, and irreducible. Furthermore, we will show that
the utility for each economic agent is at least as big under the monetary
system as under any other simple, self-enforcing, symmetric, and irreducible
trading system of the same complexity. In other words, any trading system
having the properties necessary to endure can be (weakly) dominated by
a monetary trading system of the same level of complexity. In this sense,
4monetary trading is an optimal social institution, thus rationalizing the
monetary nature of real-world trade.
We will describe our model by listing its time and uncertainty structure,
its agents, the actions available to them, and their preferences over diﬀerent
action combinations; hence, we consider a noncooperative stochastic game
(Sobel (1971)) as a natural model of the type of society we are interested
in. As is stressed by Wallace (1997), and is standard in monetary economics
models, we will consider a society in which trade between its members is
diﬃcult. The nature of this diﬃculty is what is called absence of double
coincidence of wants and consists of the following: when any pair of its
members meet, it will never be the case that both have the goods the other
would like to consume.2
Following the work of Aumann (1981), and Selten (1975), we will focus
on strategies that can be played by ﬁnite automata,3 and that are subgame
2The assumption that it will never be the case that both agents have the goods the
other would like to consume is made only for simplicity. The same results would hold in
a model where sometimes (but not always) the agents could exchange goods for goods.
3An automaton is described by a set of states (one of which is speciﬁed to be the initial
state), by a transition function (which gives the next period’s state as a function of the
current period’s state and actions), and by a behavior function (which prescribes behavior
according to the state of the automaton). As Kalai and Stanford (1988) have shown, an
automaton is an equivalent way of describing a strategy, and so throughout this paper the
5perfect. The reason we impose such restrictions is that those equilibria can
be naturally classiﬁed as simple, and self-enforcing, respectively. We will
also focus on automata that are symmetric in a similar way as in Okuno-
Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995), and are irreducible in the sense that any
state of the automaton can be reached from any other state. Note that a
reducible automaton can be simpliﬁed by reducing one state in a way that
it produces the same outcome. Thus, only irreducible automata may be
impossible to simplify.4 Finally, following Rubinstein (1986), the complexity
of an automaton is deﬁned to be the size of the state space.
We will formulate the notion of a monetary system as an automaton,
where the state space will represent money holdings, the transition func-
tion will represent how money changes hands according to production and
consumption actions, and the behavior function will represent a monetary
behavior, in the sense that a seller produces for a buyer if and only if the
buyer has enough money.
Our main results are that the monetary automaton is simple, subgame-
perfect, symmetric, and irreducible, and that the utility for each player is
at least as big under the monetary automaton as under any other simple,
two terms will be used synonymously.
4Irreducibility is also a necessary condition for semi-perfection, an equilibrium concept
developed by Rubinstein (1986).
6subgame-perfect, symmetric, and irreducible automata of the same com-
plexity. It implies that our monetary system solves an institutional design
problem — it is a Pareto eﬃcient way of obtaining those properties. In this
way we validate a long standing conjecture by Hurwicz (1980), revisited re-
cently by Kocherlakota (1998b) and Wallace (2001), which rationalizes the
monetary nature of real-world trade.
2 Related Literature
Although the focus of the present work is on monetary economics, one can
pose the following broader question: can society design a simple set of rules
in order to achieve certain goals? This question led Okuno-Fujiwara and
Postlewaite (1995) to formalize the intuitive notion of a social norm and to
study what would happen if the interactions between society members were
directed by some social norm.
In particular, they consider a version of the inﬁnitely repeated prisoners’
dilemma with a continuum of players and random matching and they deﬁne
in this setting a social norm as a special class of strategies. They then show
that the Folk Theorem (Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)) holds even when we
restrict attention to social norms rather than arbitrary strategies. In other
words, given any individually rational payoﬀ, there is a social norm with the
7property that it supports that payoﬀ and that the actions it prescribes are
optimal for every player given that the other players are using that social
norm. Later on, Kandori (1992) extended their results to the ﬁnite players
case, but the message was the same: the use of social norms may be enough
to sustain any individually rational payoﬀ as a sequential equilibrium payoﬀ
(provided that the discount factor is high enough), even in situations where
the information that each of its members have about the others is limited.
Those outcomes are supported as an equilibrium using a particular type
of norm in which an observable label is attached to each person. These labels
completely determine the behavior of players. More precisely, a person that
deviates from the equilibrium path is labelled ‘bad,’ and nobody cooperates
with a bad person; hence, nobody will cooperate with a person that has
deviated before. Such a label may not be available in many circumstances,
but as Ellison (1994), and Gata (1995) have shown, eﬃcient outcomes can
still be sustained as an equilibrium outcome without the use of any explicit
label. In this case, each player threatens to stop cooperating with everyone
after he sees a deviation from cooperation.5 In any case, the norm used is
nonmonetary, and so these papers do not address the question of why in
5Kandori (1992) also considers the case in which there is not an explicit labelling
technology. In fact, Ellison (1994) uses the same strategy as in section 3 of Kandori
(1992).
8most societies a monetary system is used to support trade.
A closely related line of research was explored by Townsend (1986). He
considers several environments characterized by spatial separation, private
information and a need to keep track of the past. He then formalizes and
compares diﬀerent types of communication-accounting systems, concluding
that these systems can be ranked in terms of social welfare, from the worst to
the best, as follows: oral assignment, portable object, written message and
telecommunication systems. However, he compares those diﬀerent types
of communication-accounting systems assuming that all the agents in the
economy will abide by the rules set by the social planner, except possibly
regarding the revelation of private information; in particular, conditional on
the information agents reveal, it is assumed that all agents will agree to the
allocation chosen by the social planner. In others words, Townsend does
not study how those diﬀerent types of communication-accounting systems
compare in a situation where the member of the society act strategically
and in a decentralized way.
Our analysis diﬀer also from that of Townsend (1986) in the following
aspects: First, since we deﬁne a system to be a strategy, we abstract from
many of its details; in particular, we abstract from any physical object which
may be used in order to achieve the behavior prescribed by the institution.
9Second, we compare monetary behavior to all possible behavior, not only to
a ﬁnite set of alternatives. Third, we obtain that a monetary system is an
optimal payment arrangement in a given class of strategies, which is not the
case in Townsend (1986) — of course, these discrepancies result from the
diﬀerent environments, and especially, from the diﬀerent class of strategies
we consider.
Similarly, Kocherlakota (2002), in an environment with absence of double
coincidence of wants, presents a “portable-object system” that can imple-
ment frequent trade between society members. Although both his system
and a monetary system are examples of portable objects systems, they are
quite diﬀerent. Hence, this paper does not address the question of why most
societies use a monetary system.
A monetary system is a possible way to allow for frequent trade between
society members. However, as discussed above, there are other ways of
accomplishing frequent transactions, namely the communication-accounting
systems described by Townsend (1986), the portable object system described
by Kocherlakota (2002) and the social norms studied by Kandori (1992),
Ellison (1994) and Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995).
These remarks lead us to Hurwicz (1980)’s conjecture that money might
be an eﬃcient way to solve some institutional design problem, which we
10validate by showing that monetary trading is a Pareto eﬃcient way of ob-
taining certain properties typically associated with social institutions. The
importance of this result is that it allow us to regard money not only as an
equilibrium outcome, but also, and more importantly, as an optimal equi-
librium.
We note, however, that our optimality result for monetary trading is
not unique. It is well know that in overlapping generations models, the
monetary equilibrium can be Pareto optimal (see Samuelson (1958).) Also,
Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998) show that, in a random matching model,
monetary trading is the optimal trading arrangement when each person’s
actions is private information to the person.
The importance of anonymity and limited information of each person
regarding the others has been frequently stressed in the literature on mone-
tary economics since the work of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989). However, as
suggested by Ellison (1994), once we consider a model with ﬁnitely many
people, the eﬃcient level of trade in a trading model can be obtained by a
non-monetary behavior even when people are anonymous and each one has
limited information about the others.6 We observe that monetary trading is
6In Carmona (2002), we used a random matching model with ﬁnitely many players
similar to both the Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) model, and the framework used by Ellison
(1994), and showed that monetary trading is indeed Pareto dominated by the Kandori-
11used in most societies. However, it could be replaced by a norm like the one
studied by Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994). Indeed this norm seems to
be used in some societies, namely in the archaic societies studied by Mauss
(1990). So, how come all trade is not supported by such a norm and why is
there any monetary trading at all?
In order to answer the above question, it is necessary to rule out the
Kandori-Ellison norm. As argued above, we cannot rely exclusively on the
notions of anonymity and limited information.7 In our framework, we can
rule out the Kandori-Ellison norm through the notion of irreducibility: it is
not irreducible because the label ‘bad’ (or, the threat to stop cooperation,
or trading) is never used in equilibrium, and hence, such norms can be
simpliﬁed by removing the ‘bad’ label.
In our view, irreducibility is not an implausible condition to impose on
equilibrium strategies: it simply requires that when faced with two alter-
natives that yield the same payoﬀ, people should choose the least complex
one.8 Irreducibility can, thus, be seen as a consequence of a lexicographic
Ellison norm.
7Because of that, and because it simpliﬁes matter considerably, we consider an extreme
case in which there are only two people in the economy, which meet in every period, and
naturally each has complete information about past actions of the other.
8More precisely, if players in a repeated game have preferences over payoﬀs generated
by the automaton (or strategy) used and over the complexity of their own automaton
12preference over payoﬀs and complexity. Moreover, it has the advantage of
capturing this intuition in a simple way, without having to introduce pref-
erences over payoﬀs and complexity explicitly.
In conclusion, our view is that monetary trading satisﬁes in optimal
way the properties that any exchange system, as a particular case of a social
institution, need to endure. We adhere to the standard view that anonymity
and limited information are important properties to rationalize monetary
trading; however, we add that the properties emphasized in this paper —
simplicity, symmetry, self-enforceability, and irreducibility — are also likely
to be an important part of it.
3 The Basic Model
There are two people, and they meet in every period t 2 N. In every period,
a given person can be a producer or a consumer; we will assume that will
be decided by nature, in a way that each person will be the producer with
1/2 probability in every period.
In our economy consumers and producers are diﬀerent in the following
then all semi-perfect equilibrium (see Rubinstein (1986)) are irreducible. See Carmona
(2003) for a related, but diﬀerent equilibrium concept that yields irreducible equilibria in
the long-run.
13way: only the producer has to make a choice, which is whether to produce
(for the consumer) or not. If the producer chooses to produce, he suﬀer a
utility cost d > 0, and the consumer receives a positive utility u > 0. If the
producer chooses not to produce, them both himself and the consumer will
receive zero utility.
We will assume that production is eﬃcient in the sense that the beneﬁt
derived by the consumer exceeds the cost incurred by the producer. That
is, we will assume that u > d.
Let N = f1;2g stand for the set of players, Ω = f1;2g for the set of
states of nature, and A = fP;NPg for the set of possible actions. We make
the convention that when the state of nature equals 1, then player 1 is the
producer, and he will choose an action from the set A; similarly, when the
state of nature equals 2, then player 2 is the producer. The payoﬀ players
receive period-wise, which depend on the state of the nature and on the




Table 1: Stage Game Payoﬀs
14We denote the period-wise payoﬀs as ui(!;a).
Intuitively, these state-of-nature-dependent payoﬀs try to capture a two
person trade meeting, in which there is absence of double coincidence of
wants. We should note that the model is not to be taken literally; in fact, it
is designed to capture the essence of the standard random-matching models
of money (Kiyotaki and Wright (1989)) in a simple way.
In the standard random matching models of money, the essential feature
is that every agent, in every period of time, has a 1
3 probability of meeting
an agent who likes the good he produces but who can not produce the good
he likes (i.e., he has a 1
3 probability of being a seller, in the above sense); has
a 1
3 probability of meeting an agent who does not like the good he produces
but who can produce the good he likes (i.e., he has a 1
3 probability of being
a buyer, in the above sense); and ﬁnally, has a 1
3 probability of meeting
an agent who neither likes the good he produces nor can produce the good
he likes (in our model, there is no situation that corresponds to this one;
however, it could be added without changing the results).
Furthermore, our model is related to the class of absence-of-double-
coincidence models of money. As in Wallace (1997), our model “contains
more than one time period”, it “has two-person meetings”, and, “a spe-
cialization pattern among people motivates trade and is consistent with the
15lack of double coincidences in two-person meetings”. It diﬀers from Wallace
(1997)’s model in that we do not a priori prevent trade from being accom-
plished in a non-monetary way. Indeed, our Theorem 1 below asserts that
monetary trading accomplishes trade, respecting some desirable properties,
in an optimal way; clearly, in order for this result to be meaningful, we need
to allow nonmonetary alternatives to accomplish trade.
As argued in section 2, in order to rationalize monetary trading, we
cannot rely exclusively on the notions of anonymity and limited information.
Because of that and because it simpliﬁes matter considerably, we consider
the extreme case in which there are only two agents in the economy, which
meet in every period, and naturally each has complete information about
the past actions of the other.
The interaction described above takes place in every period t 2 N. We
will describe the behavior of each player in the repeated game by an au-
tomaton. An automaton for player i is a triple Ii = ((Si; ¯ si);Ti;Bi) where:
Si is a set of states; ¯ si 2 Si is the initial state; Ti : Ω £ Si £ A ! Si is a
transition function; and Bi : Si ! A is a behavior function.
A pair of individual automata I = (I1;I2), or for short, an automaton,
together with a sequence of states of nature ! = f!kg1
k=1 µ Ω induce a
sequence of actions a(I;!) = fakg1
k=1 µ A in the following way: a1 =
16B!1(¯ s!1), and ak = B!k(sk
!k), where sk
i = Ti(sk¡1
i ;ak¡1), for both i = 1;2.9
For !n 2 Ωn, we deﬁne the n¡dimensional vector a(I;!n) in a similar way.
Each player’s payoﬀ in the repeated game depends on the payoﬀ he
receives in all periods, in the following way: ﬁrst, for i = 1;2, and n 2 N,
we deﬁne a function Un















where ¹n is the usual product measure (in this case, ¹n(!n) = 1=2n for all





By using the above payoﬀ function, the payoﬀ of the monetary automa-
ton, which will be described in the following section, equals the limit, as the
discount factor goes to one, of the payoﬀs computed using the discounted
sum criterion. Since in a monetary automaton players will produce in ex-
change for the future beneﬁts of having an extra amount of money, our
results would only hold in the discounted case for a suﬃciently high dis-
count factor, that is, in the limit case. By using the above payoﬀ function,
9Recall that player i is the producer in period k if !k = i, i = 1;2.
17we will be able to present our results in a clearer way, while allowing us to
simplify some of the proofs.
4 Monetary Trading
One of the reason we choose to describe players behavior using automata is
because it allows to describe monetary trading in a very convenient way. Its
deﬁnition tries to capture the way people trade in actual monetized societies,
in which one person gives goods and receives money, while some other gives
money and receives goods.
A monetary system IM = (IM
1 ;IM
2 ) with M 2 N units of money and
initial money holdings ¯ sM will be described as follows: the set of states is
SM
1 = SM
2 = SM = f0;:::;Mg; (4)
and the initial state is ¯ sM. The transition function TM
1 = TM
2 = TM :












m ¡ 1 if m ¸ 1;
m otherwise,
(6)
TM(!;m;NP) = m; (7)
18The interpretation is as follows: SM represents the set of possible money
holdings for player 1; clearly, we could obtain a similar deﬁnition for a mon-
etary system if the set of states were f(m1;m2) 2 f0;:::;Mg £ f0;:::;Mg :
m1 +m2 = Mg: Regarding TM, the intuition is: when player 1 is the seller,
that is, when ! = 1; if he produces he receives one additional unit of money,
unless player 2 does not have any money. When player 1 is the buyer, that
is, when ! = 2; if player 2 produces for him, he has to give one unit of
money to player 2, unless he (player 1) does not have any money. In the
remaining cases, there is no change in the amount of money player 1 has.






P if m < M;
NP otherwise;
(8)






P if m > 0;
NP otherwise;
(9)
Intuitively, any player produces if and only if he is a seller and the other
player has a positive amount of money. The deﬁnition of SM; TM and BM
describes a “monetary behavior” in the sense that in a two people meeting
one person gives goods and receives money, while the other gives money and
receives goods; further, it seems to be the only natural way of describing
19such a monetary behavior.
Note that the monetary automaton satisﬁes many symmetry properties.
First, we have that players use a common state space, initial state, and
transition function: SM
1 = SM
2 , ¯ sM
1 = ¯ sM
2 , and TM
1 = TM
2 . Second, some
states can be associated in a natural way: if we deﬁne Á(m) = M ¡ m, we
obtain a bijection Á : SM ! SM, satisfying BM
1 (m) = BM
2 (Á(m)). Third,
the monetary automaton induces a Markov chain on SM, described by a
symmetric transition matrix. In fact, if ΠM denotes such matrix, one easily






















Generalizing from the particular case of the monetary automaton, we
say that an automaton I = (I1;I2) is symmetric if: (1) S1 = S2, T1 = T2,
and ¯ s1 = ¯ s2; (2) there exist a bijection Á : S ! S such that B1(s) =
B2(Á(s)); and (3) I induces a Markov chain on S, described by a symmetric
transition matrix.10 Intuitively, the class of symmetric automata consist of
those that in which diﬀerent individuals in the same situation determined
by the realization of the uncertainty and with the same state are prescribed
10Note that any ﬁnite automaton I induces a Markov chain deﬁned through by the
20the same action.11
5 Monetary Trading as an Optimal Social Institu-
tion
In our model the two players interact in every period of time. This inter-
action is described by an automaton I, which consist of a pair of individual
automata: I = (I1;I2). By changing each player’s automaton, we obtain
diﬀerent outcomes, some of which may be unreasonable.
The ﬁrst requirement we impose on the automaton players use is that it
is self-enforcing. More precisely, we will require that each player, given the
other player behavior, have an incentive to act the way as the automaton
prescribes at all possible contingencies. Formally, this amounts to require
that the automaton is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
following transition matrix Π:
¼ss0 =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
1 if T (!;s;B!(s)) = s
0 for all ! = 1;2;
0 if T (!;s;B!(s)) 6= s




11Condition 3 in the deﬁnition of a symmetric automaton is far less intuitive. It would
be interesting to dispense with that condition, but unfortunately we have not been able
to do so.
21Before giving the formal deﬁnition, we need the following notation:
given an automaton I = ((S; ¯ s);T;B), then (I;s) denotes the automaton
((S;s);T;B); that is, (I;s) diﬀers from I only on the initial state. We then
say that an automaton I is a subgame perfect equilibrium if for all i = 1;2;
s in S = S1 £ S2; and any player i’s automaton I0
i; we have that
Ui(I;s) ¸ Ui((I0
i;I¡i);(s0;s¡i)): (12)
A second requirement we impose is that there are no obsolete states:
all states should be used regularly in the regular course of the game. As
Rubinstein pointed out “[these] considerations have some similarity to phe-
nomena frequently observed in real life: social institutions, various types
of organizations, and human abilities degenerate or are readily discarded if
they are not used regularly.” Formally, we say that a symmetric automaton
I is irreducible if the Markov chain induced by I is irreducible.12
The view that we take here is that, in our framework, only automata
that are ﬁnite, symmetric, subgame perfect, and irreducible can describe
a social institution. For N 2 N, let AN be the set of all symmetric, irre-
ducible, subgame perfect automata with a state space having no more than
N elements. Our main result is:
12A Markov chain represented by a transition matrix Π is irreducible if for all states s,
and s
0 there exists K 2 N such that ¼
(K)
s;s0 > 0.




Theorem 1 asserts that not only the monetary automaton is a symmetric,
irreducible, subgame perfect automaton for any possible amount of money,
but in fact, it is eﬃcient within that class. In particular, any ﬁnite, symmet-
ric, irreducible, subgame perfect automaton can be (weakly) dominated by
the monetary trading system of the same level of complexity. In this sense,
monetary trading is an optimal social institution.
We remark that given a complexity bound of N states, the optimal
monetary automaton has N states. It can be shown that such monetary au-
tomaton strictly dominates any other monetary automaton with less states.
This result, thus, resembles the Friedman’s rule (see Friedman (1969)) in
the sense that cash balances will be at their optimum when they are held
to satiety, that is, when they are such that all the states allowed by the
complexity bound are used.
6 On the Proof of Theorem 1
Although we have to deal with some technical detail to prove Theorem 1,
the ideas behind it are simple. In this section we will thus present the main
23ideas, and we leave for the appendix a detailed proof.
The ﬁrst step of the proof is to show that any monetary automaton is
symmetric, irreducible, and subgame perfect. One easily sees that any mon-
etary automaton is symmetric. Since any state can lead to the two adjacent
states, with the convention that state 0 and state M each is adjacent of
itself, one can conclude that any monetary automaton is irreducible.
To show that each monetary automaton IM is a subgame perfect equilib-
rium is more delicate. We ﬁrst study the case in which each player i payoﬀ
function in the repeated game equals
U±




where ± 2 (0;1), ! = f!kg1
k=1 µ Ω, and a = fakg1
k=1 µ A. Existing results
guarantee that if IM is subgame perfect for all discount factors close to 1,
then IM is subgame perfect in our game.
It is useful to use the discounted version of our game to show that IM
is subgame perfect because in discounted games we can use the one-shot
deviation principle (see Abreu (1988).) For the particular case of a monetary
automaton, we need to show that it is not proﬁtable for a producer to
refuse to produce for a consumer with money, and follow the monetary
strategy afterwards. If a producer deviates by not producing to a consumer
with money, his utility increases today by d, i.e., he gains by not having to
24produce. However, he starts next period with one less unit of money, and
the other player starts with one more unit of money. Hence, the diﬀerence
of payoﬀs is
(1 ¡ ±)d + ±
h
U±
i (IM;m) ¡ U±










i (IM;m) ¡ U±




Thus, to show that a deviation is not proﬁtable for all discount factors close











that is, the next step is to estimate the value of starting the game with one
extra unit of money.
If a given player i starts with an extra unit of money, it means that the
other player starts with one less unit of money. One can conjecture that
either player i will consume one more time by starting with one extra unit
of money, or she will produce one less time. This conjecture turns out to be







i (IM;m + 1) ¡ U±
i (IM;m)
i
= ®mu + (1 ¡ ®m)d; (16)
where 0 < ®m < 1 is the probability that player i will consume one more
time by starting with m+1 units of money instead of starting with m units
25of money. Since by assumption u > d, this result implies that IM is a
subgame perfect equilibrium for all ± close enough to 1.
The second step of the proof is to show that Ui(IM) ¸ Ui(I) for any
i = 1;2, and any symmetric, irreducible, and subgame perfect automaton I

































Note that in a symmetric automata the number of states in which player
1 produces equals the number of states in which player 2 produces. Since
production is eﬃcient (i.e., since u > d,) the best symmetric outcome is
obtained when production takes place in every state. The above expression
for Ui(IM) says that in the monetary automaton production occurs in all
but one state. More precisely, for every ! there is only one state in which
production does not take place, which is when the consumer does not have
money. Since in every subgame perfect equilibrium there has to be a state in
which a given player does not produces — otherwise the strategy of always
26producing would be an equilibrium, which one can easily see not to be the
case — it follows that each player’s utility of any symmetric, irreducible,









This concludes the argument, since I is assumed to have at most as much












Our main result provides a rationale for the monetary nature of exchange.
We rationalized the monetary nature of exchange by showing that in a class
of economies a monetary system can be understood as a best strategy among
a particular class of strategies.
More precisely, we have shown that there exists a class E0 of economies
(in our case indexed by the parameters u, and d) such that for all possible
money supplies M, and initial money holdings m0 there exist a monetary
system IM;m0, and a class of automata I0 such that IM;m0 is Pareto optimal
in I0.
The ﬁrst remark we make is on what is meant by a monetary system.
27As we deﬁned it in section 4, the essential features of it is that each player
conditions his behavior on money holdings in a way that he produce if and
only if his trading partner has money. Furthermore, the amount of money
that a given player has increases one unit when he produces, and decreases
one unit when he consumes (except possibly when the consumer has no
money, or when the producer has all the money in the economy.)
Implicitly, in our deﬁnition of a monetary system, we are assuming that
the price level equals 1 in every period. The stationarity of the price level
does play a role in our optimality result. In fact, it may remind us of
standard results from overlapping generations models, which state that the
stationary monetary equilibrium with constant price level is Pareto optimal
provided that (and because) the total amount of resources is also stationary
(see, for example, Champ and Freeman (1994).) As the following example
illustrates, a similar phenomenon takes place in our economy.
The following automaton I2
M describes a monetary system in which the
price level is 1 in odd periods, and 2 in even periods. We assume that
there are M units of money in the economy, with M being an even natural
number. The transition function, and the behavior function for each player
is analogous to the monetary automaton of section 4 in odd periods, and
diﬀers from this in even period since trade is conducted at an higher price
28(a precise description of I2





















Thus, a non-stationary price level leads to a drop in utility for all players.
This happens because trade is less frequent in those periods in which the
price is high. Also, note that the complexity (i.e., the number of states) of
the monetary automaton with constant prices is M+1, while the complexity
of the automaton I2
M is 2(M +1) — when prices are changing, players need
to keep track of more information. However, a monetary automaton with
constant prices,13 and 2(M + 1) states yields an even higher payoﬀ. Thus,
non-stationary prices are non-optimal because trade is less frequent, and,
more complex.
We emphasize that our main result rationalizes the monetary nature of
trade. When we deﬁned monetary trading, although we have referred to the
states of that particular automaton as money, we did not commit ourselves
to any particular type of money. As we pointed out in the introduction,
13Note that assuming that the price is equal to 1 is without loss of generality: a monetary
system with price equal to 2, total money equal to 5, and initial money holdings of player
1 equal to 3, is equivalent to a monetary system with price equal to 1, total money equal
to 3, and initial money holdings of player 1 equal to 2.
29money in our model can be made of chocolate, gold, or paper; in fact, it
can be simply memory as in Kocherlakota (1998a) — all these alternatives
produce the same outcome.
Furthermore, the type of behavior we have studied (i.e., running up and
down a balance, and choosing according to such balance) is not restricted
to buying and selling in markets. An interesting example is as follows: 14
consider a group of two people each of whom regularly invites the other to a
dinner party. It is likely that one of them invites the other more frequently,
but at some point she will stop inviting if the other never reciprocates, or
doesn’t reciprocate suﬃciently. Essentially, each host keeps a balance of how
many times she was invited by the other minus the times she returned the
courtesy, and her decision depends on this balance.
Another example in which the type of behavior that we study is present
is private credit. In our two-person model, private credit is equivalent to
money, provided that there is a limit to the amount of debt each player
can have. However, in a model with more than two players, one would be
able to distinguish money from credit: money involves only one balance per
person, while private credit requires a balance for every pair of players. An
interesting question that deserves further research is whether in such model
14I am thankful to Frank Lewis for suggesting to me this example.
30we would be able to rationalize money, credit or just the behavior common
to both.15
We also point out that there are economic situation in which the type
of monetary behavior is not present. An easy example comes from the fact
that countries allocate signiﬁcant resources to military forces, some of which
are not used at all, or at least, frequently. This example suggests to us that
the scope of our results depends, in particular, on the existence of some
agent or entity that can make credible the threat of punishments that will
not be used in equilibrium. Although all the above examples suggest the
scope of application of the results presented here, more research is needed
in order to determine the kind of economic problems to which our results
can be applied.
The interpretation that our main result provides a class of economies,
and a class of strategies in which monetary trading is optimal, suggests
additional generalizations: progress in the question of why do we observe
monetary trading can be obtained by similar results in a larger class of
economies, and which consider larger classes of strategies.
15This question could, in principle, be address in the multi-player model of Carmona
(2002). Unfortunately, we lack an analogue of Lemma 1 below for the multi-player case,
and so we are even unsure as to whether an analogous strategy as the one studied here
will be a subgame perfect equilibrium.
31A Proof of Theorem 1
In this appendix, we prove Theorem 1. We will start by showing that if for
each player i, his payoﬀ in the repeated game equals
U±




where ± 2 (0;1), ! = f!kg1
k=1 µ Ω, and a = fakg1
k=1 µ A, then the
monetary automaton is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
The following lemma estimates the beneﬁt for a given player of having
one extra unit of money.






i (IM;m + 1) ¡ U±
i (IM;m)) = ®mu + (1 ¡ ®m)d;
for i = 1;2:
Proof. Because player 1’s case is symmetric to player 2’s, we deal only
with the former.
Step 1: Some deﬁnitions.
Denote m(0) = (m + 1;M ¡ m ¡ 1) and m0(0) = (m;M ¡ m): Also,
let Ω := Ω £ Ω £ ::: be the countable inﬁnite Cartesian product of Ω; and
let (Ω;G;¹) denote the usual corresponding probability space. A generic
element of Ω is denoted by ! = f!tg1
t=1; where !t 2 Ω; for all t 2 N:
32Given !; let m(k)(!) = (m1(k)(!);m2(k)(!)) denote the amount of money
players have at the end of stage k if they started with m(0) and m0(k)(!)
denote the amount of money players have at the end of stage k if they started
with m0(0):































where the last equality follows because both the functions ! 7! U±
1(IM;m)(!)
and ! 7! U±
1(IM;m + 1)(!) are integrable.
Step 2: There exists fAt;Btg1










Let A1 := f! 2 Ω : m1(1)(!) = 0 and !1 = 2g; in A1 player 1 is able
to consume under m but not in m0. Note also that m(1) = m0(1): So, for
! 2 A1; the diﬀerence in payoﬀs is u: That is, for ! 2 A1;
U±
1(IM;m + 1)(!) ¡ U±
1(IM;m)(!) = (1 ¡ ±)u: (24)
Let B1 := f! 2 Ω : m0
2(1)(!) = 0 and !1 = 1g; in B1 player i has to
produce under m0 but not under m: Note also that m(1) = m0(1): Thus, for
33! 2 B1;
U±
1(IM;m + 1)(!) ¡ U±
1(IM;m)(!) = (1 ¡ ±)d: (25)
We proceed by induction: let t ¸ 2: Let








Bk)) : m1(t)(!) = 0 and !t = 2)g (26)
and









2(t)(!) = 0 and !t = 1g: (27)
Similarly as before, we have that for ! 2 At;
U±
1(IM;m + 1)(!) ¡ U±
1(IM;m)(!) = (1 ¡ ±)±t¡1u; (28)
and for ! 2 Bt;
U±
1(IM;m + 1)(!) ¡ U±
1(IM;m)(!) = (1 ¡ ±)±t¡1d: (29)













For each t 2 N; At is measurable since it can be written as D1 £ ::: £
Dt£Ω£Ω£::: for some D1;:::;Dt 2 Ω. Similarly, Bt is measurable for each
t 2 N and so is C: Note also that for all j;k 2 N; we have that Aj \Ak = ;;
Bj \ Bk = ; and Aj \ Bk = ;:
Claim 1 ¹(C) = 0:
34Proof. Let Sn(!) be the number of times that !k = 1 in the ﬁrst n
periods. If ! 2 C; then it follows that m1(k)(!) > 0 whenever !k = 2; for
all k: Therefore, n ¡ Sn, which equals the number of times that !t = 2; is
also the amount of money player 1 spent in the ﬁrst n periods. Since the
amount of money player 1 receives in the ﬁrst n periods is at most Sn, then










2n g which has measure zero by
lemma 2 applied to the sequence of random variables fXng1
n=1; where for






































1(IM;m + 1) ¡ U±
1(IM;m)) = ®mu + (1 ¡ ®m)d: (31)


























































The following lemma was used above:
Lemma 2 Let fXng1
n=1 be a sequence of independent and identically dis-
tributed random variables with mean equal to ½ · 1
2 and ﬁnite variance









Proof. The result will follow from the Law of Iterated Logarithm: Let
fYkg1
k=1 be independent and identically distributed random variables with
E[Y1] = 0 and ¾2(Y1) = 1. Then lim
n!1
Sn p
2nloglogn = ¡1 a:s: (Billingsley




























































inﬁnitely often (the last inequality follows because for n large enough c <
¾
p

















ng µ Z and the result follows.
Lemma 3 There exists ±¤ 2 (0;1) such that for all ± 2 (±¤;1); IM is sub-
game perfect.
Proof. By Proposition 3.11 of Mertens and Parthasarathy (1987)) (or
Proposition 1 of Abreu (1988)) it is enough to show that no player can prof-
itably deviate from IM by deviating just in the ﬁrst stage. Again, because
player 1’s case is symmetric to player 2’s, we deal only with the former.
It is clear that player 1 does not want to deviate from BM
1 (M) = NP,
since by choosing P when he has all the money he would reduce his utility
today by d, and receive the same future utility. So we are left to show that
he does not want to deviate from BM
1 (m), for all m = 0;:::;M ¡ 1.
Let m 2 f0;:::;M ¡1g. If player 1 deviates from BM
1 (m), and therefore
chooses NP, his utility will be equal to
¯ U := (1 ¡ ±)±U±
1(IM;m); (34)
37while if he does not deviate, his utility will be equal to
U±
1(IM;m) = (1 ¡ ±)(¡d + ±U±
1(IM;m + 1)): (35)
Thus,
U±





















¡d + ®mu + (1 ¡ ®m)d > 0:
(37)





1(IM;m + 1) ¡ U±
1(IM;m)) > 0 (38)
for all m 2 f0;:::;M ¡ 1g, then
U±
1(IM;m) ¡ ¯ U > 0 (39)
for all m 2 f0;:::;M ¡ 1g.









38Proof. Let I 2 AN, and let ˜ S = Ω £ S. Then I also induces a Markov
chain ˜ Π on ˜ S satisfying
˜ ¼i;j = ¼i2;j2; (41)
for all i = (i1;i2), and j = (j1;j2) in ˜ S.
Since Π is symmetric and irreducible, then so will be ˜ Π. Denoting ˜ s1 =



































for i = 1;2, since the uniform distribution is the unique stationary distribu-












The following lemma states that in any subgame perfect equilibrium
there has to be a “punishment” state, which is a seller refusing to produce
for a buyer in our model.
Lemma 5 Let I 2 AN. Then, for all i = 1;2; there exists s 2 S such that
Bi(s) = NP:
39Proof. Suppose that for some i 2 f1;2g; we have Bi(s) = P; for all
s 2 S: Let ˜ I¡i be such that B¡i(s) = NP; for all s 2 S, which implies
that U¡i(Ii; ˜ I¡i) = u=2. Suppose, in order to reach a contradiction, that







< U¡i(Ii; ˜ I¡i); (45)
a contradiction since I is a subgame perfect equilibrium. Thus, I¡i = ˜ I¡i,
and so Ui(I) = ¡d=2.
But, letting ˜ Ii be such that Bi(s) = NP; for all s 2 S, we obtain
Ui(˜ Ii;I¡i) = Ui(˜ I) = 0 > Ui(I). This shows that Ii is not a best response
to I¡i, which is a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let N 2 N be given, and let M = N ¡ 1. We
ﬁrst establish that IM belongs to AN. It is clear that IM is symmetric, and
since, for all m 2 SM;
¼
(M)
mM ¸ ¼mm+1 ¢¢¢¼M¡1M | {z }
M¡m terms
¼MM ¢¢¢¼MM | {z }
m terms
> 0: (46)







Mm0 > 0; (47)
that is, the Markov Chain induced by IM is irreducible.
Finally, to show that IM is a subgame perfect equilibrium, we proceed
as follows: Let i = 1, and s 2 SM. Given IM
2 , player 1 faces a Markovian
40decision problem, where the state space is ˜ S = Ω£S, the initial state is either
(1;s) or (2;s), each with 1/2 probability, and the transition probabilities
ql;j(a) are as follows: let l = (!;m); if either ! = 2 or ! = 1, and a = P,
then for all m 2 SM,
ql;j(a) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
1
2 if j = (1;TM(!;m;B!(m)))
1
2 if j = (2;TM(!;m;B!(m)))
0 otherwise.
(48)
If ! = 1, and a = NP then for all m 2 SM,
ql;j(a) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
1
2 if j = (1;m)
1
2 if j = (2;m)
0 otherwise.
(49)
By Corollary 3.1 in Derman (1970), there exists a ﬁnite automaton I¤
1 that is
a best reply to IM
2 at state s. By Theorem A.1 in Derman (1970) and Abel’s
Theorem (DePree and Swartz (1988), Chapter 11, Theorem 17, page 135)
we have that U1(IM;s) = lim±!1 U±










1 is a best reply to IM
2 at state s. Using an analogous argument
for i = 2, we conclude that IM is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
We are left to show that U1(IM)+U2(IM) ¸ U1(I)+U2(I) for all I 2 AN.









Let SP = fs 2 S : B2(s) = Pg and SNP = fs 2 S : B2(s) = NPg: By



















Because I is a subgame perfect equilibrium, jSNPj ¸ 1; and so jSPj =


















Since, by symmetry, U2(IM) = U1(IM) ¸ U1(I) = U2(I); the result follows.
B A Monetary Automaton with Oscillating Prices
In this appendix, we describe formally the monetary system in which the
price level is 1 in odd periods, and 2 in even periods. We assume that
42there are M units of money in the economy, with M being an even natural
number. Player 1 starts with m0 of this M units. The state space of I2
M is
S = f0;:::;Mg £ fe;og, where e stands for even, and o for odd, and the
initial state is ¯ s = (m0;o).
The transition function is given by is deﬁned by:
T(!;a;(m;®)) =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
(m + 1;e) if ! = 1;a = P;m · M ¡ 1 and ® = o;
(m;e) if ! = 1;a = P;m = M and ® = o;
(m + 2;o) if ! = 1;a = P;m · M ¡ 2 and ® = o;
(m;o) if ! = 1;a = P;m ¸ M ¡ 1 and ® = o;
(m ¡ 1;e) if ! = 2;a = P;m ¸ 1 and ® = o;
(m;e) if ! = 2;a = P;m = 0 and ® = o;
(m ¡ 2;o) if ! = 2;a = P;m ¸ 2 and ® = o;
(m;o) if ! = 2;a = P;m · 1 and ® = o;
(m;¡®) otherwise,
(54)
where ¡® = e if ® = o, and ¡® = o if ® = e.
Finally, player 1’s behavior function is deﬁned as follows:
B1(m;®) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
P if m < M and ® = o;
P if m < M ¡ 1 and ® = e;
NP otherwise;
(55)
43and, similarly, for player 2:
B2(m) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
P if m > 0 and ® = o;
P if m > 1 and ® = e;
NP otherwise;
(56)
This automaton induces two Markov chains Πo, and Πe on f0;:::;Mg,
the former describing the evolution of money holdings in odd periods, and
the latter the same in even periods. One can easily see that both chains are
symmetric and irreducible, and so we obtain (see Lemma 4, and its proof)
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